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Can statism help with burning issues of the present time? The authors in 
the collection mostly answer affi rmatively; in their view states can suc-
cessfully deal with their cosmopolitan responsibilities. In the discussion, 
we question this optimistic assumption, and suggest the need for a more 
supra-statist, cosmopolitan arrangement for solving the issues.
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The volume is a challenging endeavour in political philosophy. Talking 
about it the editors write: “By seeking to bring the state explicitly back 
into the cosmopolitan discourse, it helps advance enquiry into whether 
and how the state may be an agent of, rather than an obstacle to, cos-
mopolitanism” (5 ). Further, “(…) this book seeks to investigate the pos-
sibility that states can become bearers of cosmopolitan responsibilities 
while also remaining vehicles for popular self-determination within 
persisting, and at times counteracting, conditions of global pluralism” 
(5). For historical sources the editors, Garrett Wallace Brown and Sam-
uel Jarvis, appeal to a reading of Kant
As Kant suggests, a cosmopolitan matrix might develop from ‘one power-
ful and enlightened nation…a republic’ and that this could ‘provide a focal 
point for federal association among other states’ (Kant 1970: 104). (…) Ac-
cording to Kant, the motivation for joining any alliance is not determined 
by the ‘motivations of morality’, but motivated on the empirical and political 
realities embedded within global relations (Kant 1970: 114). (205)
The volume consists of Part I “The Responsibility to Protect as a Cos-
mopolitan Doctrine”, Part II “Cosmopolitan Responsibility and The Le-
gal Practice of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction”, Part III “Global Issues 
and Responsibility Beyond the State,” and the Part IV “Cosmopolitan 
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Republicanism.” Most papers are in line with the mainstream pro-
statist intention, with the exception of a few written by well-known 
cosmopolitans, like Luis Cabrera and David Held with which we mostly 
agree; we shall here focus on the mainstream papers.
Can the proposed model of independent states with some mutual 
interaction, but without a strong supra-state apparatus, call it “the in-
tergovernmental model of democratic states”, deal with burning crises 
of contemporary world, in the fi rst line the refugee crises, and distant 
confl icts that have been provoking it?1 Can its real-life incarnation pro-
tect distant people in need of protection? This is the guiding question of 
the present book, mostly centred upon the need to protect often distant 
threatened people; the fi rst part bears the corresponding title „The Re-
sponsibility to Protect as a Cosmopolitan Doctrine,” various parts and 
chapters reply to different sub-question. Some of these stem from glob-
al problems, like climate change (ch. 9) or health problems (ch. 10), oth-
ers from specifi c principles governing the democratic states (the whole 
Part IV is dedicated to cosmopolitan republicanism). Some papers, in 
fact majority of them, promote a statist model, and a minority makes 
steps towards more cosmopolitan alternatives.
In this review, we shall stress the guiding question, and then briefl y 
look at two additional issues, the climate change and the problem of 
global health. Let us then start with the paper dedicated explicitly to 
the crisis governing the recent political situation, Michael W. Doyle’s 
“Global Refugee Crisis”. Doyle proposes that what is required is “to 
reform existing global structures in order to create alternative gover-
nance pathways” (94). The pathways should refl ect fi rst ‘culpability’ for 
causing the harm, i.e. chasing away the population; he mentions exam-
ples like Daesh and Nusra. Second, it should reckon realistically with 
‘capability’ of the candidate host countries to provide assistance, which 
should be, as he puts it “at least proportionate to national cost” (94).
Now, Doyle’s brief proposal for how to accomplish the fi rst task is 
really minimalistic. He mentions “referral” and then notes that “the 
UN Security Council would be justifi ed in seizing the overseas fi nancial 
assets of the Syrian state and any terrorist group with seizable assets” 
and using them to pay for the support of refugees on the Syrian border 
(92). Sounds at least minimally optimistic, but the reader learns im-
mediately the crucial piece of information: all this would be politically 
very diffi cult “to apply in many crises” (92). Why this proposal counts 
as a realistic one is completely unclear to me.
Note that the wider framework of Doyle’s refl ection is the appeal 
to the “responsibility to protect” (as formulated throughout the book); 
the activity in question should address the causes of the refugee infl ux, 
and thus prevent future crisis of the same sort. If what Doyle is offer-
ing is all that the statist line has to offer, and we have good reasons to 
1 I am borrowing the term “the intergovernmental model of democratic states” 
from Michael Zürn (2018: ch. 9, passim).
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assume that it is the case, it would be rational to abandon it, I would 
think!
Consider now the capability considerations, as presented by Doyle. 
He starts by reminding us of the preamble to the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention suggesting solidarity and international cooperation. Then he 
reminds the reader that the application of the Convention proposal has 
ended with a “collapse in the EU”; he concludes that we need more 
modest proposals.  Under the fi rst one, countries of potential resettle-
ment would commit to pledging the share of the identifi ed need they 
will cover; under the second, “countries could make their family, labour 
and student visas more readily available to refugees, by giving prior-
ity to refugees and forced migrants” (94) or do something of the kind 
to alleviate their situation. And this very hypothetical proposal is all 
he offers at the side of political institution.  Another way is “mobilizing 
the private sector” for measures like private sponsorship of refugee re-
settlement and the like. And this is all! No positive institutional story, 
and some privately organized ad hoc cures for the burning problems!
To conclude, let me quote Doyle’s excellent diagnosis of the problem, 
from the beginning of the chapter.
The current problems facing the international refugee system are deeply 
rooted in the dual principles of national sovereignty and universal human 
rights embedded in the post-Second World War global regime. The 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights affi rms that everyone has a right to 
leave a country. Yet the principle of national sovereignty holds that no one 
has a right to enter another country without its sovereign permission. (88)
I agree about the roots of the problem, and I think it speaks against 
principles of natural sovereignty in favour of a more cosmopolitan ar-
rangement. Let me stress that Doyle is one of the most competent and 
intelligent defenders of the status quo statist approach. If this is the 
most that can be said from the statist viewpoint, it tells a lot against 
the viewpoint!
The discussion of refugee crisis leads naturally to the issue of its 
distant causes, and prominently of violence and warfare in relatively 
distant regions that force people to migrate. The issue is discussed in 
the book relatively independently from the context of crisis; as we said 
it goes under the name of “The Responsibility to Protect”, shortened to 
“R2P”; the fi rst part of the book is specifi cally dedicated to it.
The fi rst paper of the fi rst part, by Alex J. Bellamy and Blagovesta 
Tacheva, entitled “R2P and the Emergence of Responsibilities Across 
Borders” is only partly in the spirit of the book as the whole. It does 
suggest, in a modest fashion that “R2P is primarily a responsibility to 
consider taking action to protect populations from genocide and mass 
atrocities—a ‘responsibility to try’” (35). But when it comes to the sig-
nifi cation of this responsibility, it turns to David Held as a guide, and 
Held is, of course, much less statist and more fi rmly cosmopolitan. Fol-
lowing him, our authors suggest that “although the recognition of the 
principle is an important and necessary fi rst step, it should, in further 
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development “materialize” into a “fully-fl edged cosmopolitan respon-
sibility” (35). But for Held, such fully-fl edged responsibility leads to 
a Global Covenant, as the title of his (2004) book suggests; and the 
Covenant proposes a supra-nationally controlled loose federation, very 
far from the statist model favored by the mainstream of the book. (We 
shall skip here Held’s contribution to the volume, entitled “Cosmopoli-
tanism in the Face of Gridlock in Global Governance” with which we 
very much agree, but which lies completely outside the mainstream 
project of the book).
This brings us to the last two papers of the fi rst part, both strictly 
in the mainstream line. Let me start with Toni Erskine’s “Coalitions of 
the Willing and the Shared Responsibility to Protect”. As the title sug-
gests, she proposes informal ‘coalitions of the willing’ as a means for 
discharging the obligation, and characterize them as “ad hoc associa-
tions”. We can agree with her that states have a moral duty to estab-
lish such association. However, it is incredible that ad hoc voluntary 
associations could be the main guarantee of protection of human rights 
of the world population! What if we face, like we do these days, a very 
wide coalition of the unwilling, blocking informal, ad hoc attempts to 
the contrary? Even if we assume states to be more hospitable than they 
are these days, in line with authors like Kant and Seyla Benhabib, is 
there any force in such a system that would force, or almost force them 
to enter such ad hoc coalitions?
Things look similarly with the remaining paper in the fi rst part, 
Derek Edyvane’s and James Souter’s “Good International Citizenship 
and Cosmopolitan Responsibilities to Protect”.
At its best, the ritual of parliamentary debate may also serve the function 
of acknowledging, containing, and communicating confl ict. (…). The ritual 
here, of rival perspectives passionately voiced across the aisle (and on either 
side of it) in lengthy debate leading to a vote is of tremendous symbolic 
importance. But its signifi cance is not purely symbolic. (…) the adversarial 
institutional framework serves both as ‘an essential obstacle against the 
happy acceptance of the intolerable’, and as the ‘correct reaction’ to cases of 
deep, and possibly ineliminable, confl ict. (54)
Specifi cally, we have suggested that the integrity of the good international 
citizen, and its commitment to cosmopolitan ideals such as R2P, is pre-
served by habits of reluctance and caution, its unwavering commitment to 
adversarial institutional frameworks, as well as by practices of reparation. 
So doing offers to drive a wedge, albeit a fragile one, between moral confl ict 
and tragedy (57)
Can we really accept as a political norm a system that offers merely 
a “fragile wedge” between moral confl ict and tragedy? In Srebreni-
ca, a fragile wedge between the two was provided by UNPROFOR’s 
370 Dutchbat soldiers, and the world has learned not to trust such 
weak wedges. We may conclude that the upshot of the papers meant to 
defend the ability of a statist system to ensure rights of distant people 
is quite dissatisfying. However, the last part of the book offers an at-
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tempt in the same direction, the difference being that it starts from a 
“republican” model of states offering the protection of rights and the 
rest of R2P repertoire.
Some papers discuss the differences between republican perspec-
tive and the alternatives (mostly classical liberal ones), stressing non-
domination as the main virtue of republicanism, but without saying 
much about specifi cally cosmopolitan aspects of it. Thus, we shall skip 
them, and concentrate upon those that propose clear republican con-
straints on global actions, in particular the ones geared to responsible 
protection.
In her contribution entitled “The Cosmopolitan Responsibilities of 
Republican States” Miriam Ronzoni stresses the republican principle 
of non-domination, her statement most relevant for the present con-
text, concerns republican constraints on humanitarian intervention. 
She notes that such interventions are heavily constrained in relation 
to conditions, justifying reasons and kinds of acts of war permitted. 
And then she adds, as the republican comment, that that “if any kind 
of forceful intervention entails some domination, this is always a pro-
tanto evil from a republican perspective” and that “if domination can be 
minimized, it should” (327).
The second claim seems almost trivial: of course, if you can help the 
victims in a less domineering way, it would be a good thing to do. The 
weight of the fi rst depends on how we read the “pro-tanto” formulation. 
The usual reading would take “pro-tanto” to ascribe some badness to 
the act in question. But take the simple analogy. Suppose John saves 
Jane from a serious rapist attacker by hitting him hard, and a com-
mentator, call her Miriam, claims that the saving act was bad in a 
certain aspect, “pro-tanto”. Commonsensically viewed, Miriam is just 
wrong; the act is simply not bad. A philosopher might defend Miriam 
by saying that “pro-tanto bad” here means just that it would have been 
better if there had been no need to defend the person in question, and 
no attack at all. True but trivial; it does not make the act of saving Jane 
bad in any way. The same holds for Ronzoni’s view of the pro-tanto 
badness of a humanitarian intervention. Suppose, the attacker coun-
try A is performing genocide on members of the victim country V; the 
rescuer country or coalition R intervenes, and by intervening forcefully 
breaks the will of A leaders, thus dominating it, and saves the people 
of V. If Ronzoni claims that therefore the rescuer action has been bad 
“in some respect” she is wrong. The only badness that can be located 
around consist in the fact that it was bad that help was needed, like 
in our rapist story. But this is trivial and irrelevant for judging the act 
of the rescuer. (Another meaning of pro-tanto, namely prima facie, or 
defeasibly, is not relevant here: if the act is merely prima facie bad, but 
is in fact not bad at all, since the potential badness is defeated in the 
particular case, there is no disagreement about intervention. Take the 
example of driving through red light in order to save someone’s life, as 
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Smiljana Gantner reminded me. Here, the possible badness is defeated 
by circumstances, and there is nothing bad about the action itself. Ron-
zoni’s claim that the issues of this kind are “extremely tricky” (327) 
cannot hold for the reasons she is offering
An additional worry for Ronzoni comes from the following question: 
suppose the act that broke the will of the attackers, thus dominating 
them, is performed by the victims and it was dominating in minimal 
amount needed to save the victims. Would the act be in any respect 
bad? I can’t see that it would.
Steven Slaughter’s “Republican Citizens and Political Responsibil-
ity in a Globalizing World” discusses the ways in which political agents 
could “develop responsive governance beyond the state”. He lists sev-
eral options. “The fi rst and most fundamental way is to pragmatically 
augment the virtues that inform republican citizenship” (313). His line 
seems to be individuals’ focus. It stresses the need of presenting “cos-
mopolitanism as a personal virtue that informs the ways that citizens 
conceive of politics and direct the state” (314) reciprocal concern for 
all human beings as necessary to realize liberty in a highly interde-
pendent world (see Turner 2002). Also, one should extend the range of 
refl ective deliberation about political discourse and policies so as to en-
compass radical and dramatic changes like the global ecological ones. 
Next, he prompts us to “rethink what contestation means within 
contestatory democracy to ensure that there are opportunities for delib-
eration between republican citizens and formal International Govern-
mental Organizations (IGOs) set up by states. Finally, along the same 
lines, he notes that republican citizens should have critical respect for 
transnational activism and the resulting deliberations in transnational 
civil society. All this would help to “extend political responsibility and 
responsive governance beyond the state without developing a global 
political community or a cosmopolitan form of democracy” (316).  When 
one looks at his 2015 book (co-authored with Daniel Bray) one wonders 
at how modest his new republican requirements are.
In short, the republican perspective, for all its other potential mer-
its, seems not to offer any additional arguments for the view that a 
statist global arrangement can fulfi l trans-national moral obligations 
in a stable and reliable way.
Let us now briefl y move to other issues. The two that receive de-
tailed treatment are climate change (in the chapter  “Climate Change 
and Cosmopolitan Responsibilities” written by Helga Hafl idadottir and 
Anthony F. Lang, Jr) and global  health (addressed in Garrett Wallace 
Brown and Samuel Jarvis “Motivating Cosmopolitanism and the Re-
sponsibility for the Health of Others”).
Hafl idadottir and Lang acknowledge that things are not very rosy 
when it comes to the behavior of great powers in relation to climate 
change; they remind us that the main international document on the 
issue, The Paris Accord can be interpreted as a weakening of state re-
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sponsibility “because it provides space for states to create their own 
emissions targets” (185). However, they offer an optimistic perspective 
on the development, claiming that “progress has happened within in-
ternational legal and institutional frameworks, and that this progress 
is led by states” (185) A great deal of progress is due to NGOs, but 
some is due to activist states, and this last point is the main source 
of optimism. Small activist states, like Peru and Fiji lead some activ-
ism in the direction of a more just distribution of responsibilities. They 
conclude optimistically: “We look to progress in international law and 
international organizations, the realm of states, to suggest that states 
can and do fulfi l responsibilities in regards to climate change” (199).
A more pessimistically disposed reader might wonder whether the 
morals of the factual story are not really opposite to what Hafl idadot-
tir and Lang propose. If the most powerful statist actors do not respect 
the principle of shared responsibility,2 which is, on the contrary, pro-
moted by non-state agencies, by supra-state organization like EU and 
respected by some small activist states, doesn’t this point in the direc-
tion of radical non-suffi ciency of the state system, and to the need for 
supra-statist agencies that could make the principal actors respect the 
principle?
Consider now the chapter by Garrett Wallace Brown and Samuel 
Jarvis “Motivating Cosmopolitanism and the Responsibility for the 
Health of Others”. It comprises two parts; the fi rst is completely gener-
al, and presents authors’ contribution to the general project of the book, 
and the second is specifi cally about issues of health. The centrepiece 
of the fi rst part is the idea of “transitional cosmopolitanism”, charac-
terized as a position “which sits somewhere between motivated state 
communal self-interest and iterative advancement towards a poten-
tial cosmopolitan condition.” (214). Such cosmopolitanism would unite 
global cosmopolitan interests and “the self-motivated security interests 
of states” (214) It would rest on an “iterative foundation”; each stage Si 
arrived at in a given time ti by means M would be re-submitted to M, in 
order to produce the next stage Si+1 at the later time ti+1 (the shorthand 
is mine. Finally, “the motivation for political action promotes, in some 
form, a wider recognition of a common human condition that requires 
moral and/or political coordination and mutual responsibilities”, condi-
tion “from which a form of potential cosmopolitics emerges”. (214) In 
particular cases we need not appeal to interests of “humanity” as a 
whole; what is important is that the particular iterative process does 
enter the cosmopolitan transition.
A problem that arises at this juncture derives from the fact that the 
authors tell the reader nothing about the “potential cosmopolitan con-
dition” to which the proposed stages form the transition. If the reader 
2 The authors refer to “The principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities 
and Respective Capabilities” as the valid principle that should govern the behavior 
of states.
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consults writings by Brown (2005) and (2009) she will fi nd out that he 
proposes a relatively fi rm kind of Kantian “world federation”, a sys-
tem of states with a strong cosmopolitan control: “states would have 
to bind themselves to additional procedures of global interdependence 
and to the fi nal outcomes of a mutually agreed governance process” 
(2005: 518).
The second part, on global health, offers an interpretation of global 
health-related international documents from the perspective of transi-
tional cosmopolitanism. Brown and Jarvis fi nely document the impor-
tance of the ideal of universal health coverage (UHC) contained with-
in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), and adopted by World 
Bank in 2016. And they point out the connection to cosmopolitanism: 
“At least in spirit, the language of SDG 3.8 clearly captures movement 
towards the cosmopolitan ideals of universal care and equitable bur-
den sharing in the distribution of health services” (218). The measures 
proposed, they claim, thus “meet the conditions of transitional cosmo-
politanism” (218).
Let me fi nally mention several papers which argue that countries 
should use extraterritorial laws to control the behavior of their own 
citizens when abroad. For instance, Melissa Curley in her “Exporting 
Harmful People” notes:
This chapter argues that Australia’s use of extraterritorial law in relation 
to child sex tourism (CST) illustrates and supports Linklater’s thesis that, 
for some states, globalization has concurrently led to an expanded sense of 
responsibility for transborder harms (Linklater 2011). The chapter dem-
onstrates that states can incorporate cosmopolitan harm conventions into 
domestic legislation that serves to punish and restrict the travel of ‘harmful 
people’—that is, those that have been convicted of sexual offences against 
children and are deemed likely to reoffend. (120)
I fi nd the cosmopolitan consequences of this reasonable proposal truly 
minimalistic. Other papers along the same line encompass the ones 
by Richard Shapcott (“Cosmopolitan Extraterritoriality”), Danielle 
Ireland-Piper, and Andrew Linklater. We shall skip them here, with 
apologies.
Finally, let me say a few words about a paper that is beyond the 
mainstream, David Held’s “Cosmopolitanism in the Face of Gridlock in 
Global Governance”. It offers a diagnosis of the present-day problems, 
and a proposal of a possible pathway out of it. He starts by asserting 
that “global political theory (…) has reached a cosmopolitan plateau 
(244); cosmopolitanism is one of the main topics and standpoints in it. 
But we are “at a crossroads.” One road leads to the rise of nationalism 
and authoritarianism, while another leads to a more cosmopolitan fu-
ture (he compares the present situation with the one in 1930s). In his 
opinion, there are four reasons for this “gridlock” as he calls it: rising 
multipolarity, institutional inertia, harder problems, and institutional 
fragmentation. Each pathway can be thought of as a growing trend 
that embodies a specifi c mix of causal mechanisms. The core multilat-
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eral institutions created seventy years ago, for example, the UN Se-
curity Council, have proven diffi cult to change (institutional inertia.) 
The problems on a global scale “have grown more complex, penetrat-
ing deep into domestic policies and are often extremely diffi cult to re-
solve” (250). Finally, “in many areas international institutions have 
proliferated with overlapping and contradictory mandates, creating a 
confusing fragmentation of authority” (250). I fi nd his diagnosis very 
persuasive.
He proposes fi ve possible pathways to change. First, civil society 
coalitions with reformist governments, second international organiza-
tions “more autonomous and adaptive”, third “plurality and diversity 
of actors and agencies around common goals and norms” (254), fourth, 
possible positive consequences of “threats to major powers’ core inter-
ests”, and fi fth, “innovative leadership as a reaction to gridlock”.
To return to the mainstream papers in the book and conclude on 
a positive side, let me note that the papers stem from well-known au-
thors, who really did their best to promote an up-to-date statist ap-
proach, with global ambitions. They throw interesting light on crucial 
problems of contemporary world, from the protection of fundamental 
human rights to the issues of climate change and health; it is a pity 
that they do not address the issues of poverty and unjust distribution 
in general. They suggest how far the statist international system could 
go in promoting cosmopolitan goals, and present an interesting chal-
lenge to the defenders of non-statist cosmopolitan alternatives geared 
to the realization of the same or similar goals.
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